On the potential for observational equivalence in experiments on risky choice when a power utility function is assumed by Peel, David & Zhang, Jie
Economics Letters 116 (2012) 8–10Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
On the potential for observational equivalence in experiments on risky choice
when a power value function is assumed
D.A. Peel ∗, Jie Zhang
University of Lancaster, Management Centre, Department of Economics, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 27 April 2011
Received in revised form
16 December 2011
Accepted 20 December 2011













a b s t r a c t
We demonstrate theoretically and illustrate the implications of assuming power utility when the true
function is of the expo-power form. Empirical results can appear to be consistent with cumulative
prospect theory when they are in fact generated from a Markowitz model.
Crown Copyright© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In numerous empirical studies of the efficacy of cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) to fit experimental data, it has been assumed
that the value function has the power form (see, for example,
Camerer and Ho (1994), Scott (2006), Harrison et al. (2010)).
However, the assumption of a power value function conflicts
with other important empirical evidence. For example, Holt and
Laury (2002) examine agent choices between a sequence of safe
and risky gambles when the probabilities are held fixed and the
payoff size is varied. Increases in the payoff levels lead agents to
switch their choice from ‘risky’ to ‘safe’ lotteries.
Holt and Laury (2002) report estimates of the expo-power value
function which, unlike the power value function, allows agents
to switch from a ‘risky’ to a ‘safe’ choice as the payoff size is
increased. It also has the convenient property, as demonstrated by
Abdellaoui et al. (2007), that it nests the power function and also
the Markowitz (1952) model of non-expected utility.
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doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.116The purpose of this letter is to demonstrate theoretically and to
illustrate with a simulated data set that estimates of CPT based on
a power value function can appear to parsimoniously fit the data
set when the true model is of the Markowitz (1952) form. We also
report estimates based on a real data set, which suggest that this
has some empirical validity.
In Section 2, we briefly set out the surely neglected Markowitz
model and some experimental evidence that is consistent with it.
In Section 3, we employ simulated data from theMarkowitzmodel
and illustrate how estimates based on a power value function can
appear to provide empirical support for CPT. We also report esti-
mates of theMarkowitzmodel and a variety ofmixturemodels em-
ploying the experimental data of Harrison et al. (2010). The final
section offers a brief conclusion.
2. The Markowitz model of utility
Markowitz (1952) assumed that, from a customary or normal
level of wealth (which is the reference point), agents’ value
functions are bounded and initially risk seeking then risk averse
over gains, and initially risk adverse then risk seeking over losses.
He also assumed that agents are loss averse in the sense later
l rights reserved.
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people avoid symmetric bets. This suggests that the curve falls
faster to the left of the origin than it rises to the right. We may
assume that |U(−X)| > U(X), X > 0 where X = 0 is customary
wealth’ (Markowitz, 1952, pp. 154–155). Markowitz only analyzed
outcomes of risky choicewhen agents were assumed not to exhibit
probability distortion. This was ‘because we are concerned with
a hypothesis about the utility function and do not want to get
involved in questions concerning subjective probability beliefs’
(Markowitz, 1952, p. 155). The Markowitz model embodying
probability distortion is a generalization of CPT in which the agent
is assumed risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, the
value functions are not bounded,1 and agents are loss averse. There
is considerable body of experimental evidence consistent with a
Markowitz value function. (See, for example, Levy and Levy (2002),
Pennings and Smidts (2003), Weber and Chapman (2005), Bosch-
Domènech and Silvestre (2010).)
3. The power value function and observational equivalence
As first noted by Abdellaoui et al. (2007), a parametric
specification that nests both the Markowitz and Tversky and
Kahneman value functions can be based on the expo-power
function of Saha (1993).
For simplicity, we only consider outcomes defined over gains
(G). In this case, the expo-power value function, Eu, is given by




where G is the gain and r and n are positive constants. With
n ≤ 1, the agent is risk averse over gains as hypothesized by
Tversky and Kahneman. With n > 1, we obtain the form of value
function hypothesized by Markowitz. The agent is initially risk
seeking, n−1nr > G
n, then risk averse, n−1nr < G
n. The expo-power
utility function has the convenient property that it nests the power
function as r → 0 (by L’Hopital’s Rule).
Employing the expo-power function, we illustrate how the
assumption of power utility can lead to observationally equivalent
results between the different models. We assume that an agent
has a Markowitz value function with parameters r = 0.022 and
n = 1.1. The agent is assumed not to exhibit probability distortion.
Using experimental methods as in Abdellaoui (2000), the certainty
equivalent (ce) values of the following two lotteries, A and B, are
elicited.
A: 0.05 probability of 50 and 0.95 probability of 0, and
B: 0.1 probability of 100 and 0.90 probability of 0.
We assume that the certainty equivalents of lotteries A and B
are calculated correctly as 1.85 and 4.35, respectively. Values of
the power exponent (k) and the distortion parameter (δ) consistent
with the elicited certainty equivalents are obtained from the
relationship




[pδ + (1− p)δ] 1δ
(3)
is the probability weighting function employed in many empirical
studies, (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), and where p is the
objective probability and δ is a constant.Fig. 1. Intersecting frontiers for certainty equivalents when power utility rather
the correct expo-power utility is assumed.
In Fig. 1, we plot the k and δ frontiers for the power
exponents and the distortion parameters consistent with each
elicited certainty equivalent value.
We observe that there are an infinite number of combinations
of k and δ which generate the elicited certainty equivalents of
the two lotteries and, importantly, that the frontiers intersect.
The intersection occurs in our example with a power exponent
value of approximately k = 0.8 and a distortion parameter value
of approximately δ = 0.85. Consequently, a value of k, epsilon
more than 0.8 or epsilon less than 0.85 would lead us to suppose,
erroneously, that CPT is the appropriate model.
In order to test this hypothesis more formally, we assumed
a Markowitz utility function with zero probability distortion and
r fixed at 0.02. We varied n randomly between 1.27 and 1.1
and generated 1000 utility certainty equivalents for lotteries
employing probabilities between 0.0001 and 0.95 and payoffs
between 0.1 and 320. We fitted the power value function with the
probability weighting function given by (3) to this simulated data.
We obtained an estimate of the power exponent, k = 0.65, and
the probability distortion parameter, δ = 0.62.3 For this simulated
data set we would accept the CPT model even though this is not
the case.
Clearly the estimated values of k and δwill change aswe change
the probabilities, the payoffs, and the value of r in the risky choice
experiment. However, the estimates on simulated data reveal that
CPT embodying a power value functionmay parsimoniously fit the
data when the true model is of the Markowitz form.
To see if this has import in real data sets, we estimated the
Markowitz model with probability distortion employing the data
set of Harrison et al. (2010). Harrison et al. (2010) assumed a power
value function. Again we assumed that the probability distortion
was given by (3).
The Harrison et al. data set consists of 3717 observations of the
responses of 531 subjects to 7 risky choice questions answered by
poor agents in Ethiopia, India, and Uganda. An important feature of
the Harrison et al. experiments is that the ‘risky’ choices involved
large real payoffs that were 250%, 339%, and 278% of daily wages.
We employ this data set to determine whether the Markowitz
1 It is now recognised that the assumption that the value functions are bounded
is necessary in applications of CPT in areas such as finance. See, for example, De
Giorgi and Hens (2006).
2 We should note that Holt and Laury (2002) report a value of r = 0.029.
3 We also obtained qualitatively the same result for another experiment based on
the Markowitz specification involving two outcome gambles, or where the choice
is between a risky lottery and a safe alternative. All data are available on request.
10 D.A. Peel, J. Zhang / Economics Letters 116 (2012) 8–10Table 1
Estimation results for different models.




















The estimation is based on 3717 observations from Harrison et al. (2010).
p1 is the percentage of data explained by the power function in the mixture
model. n1 and δ1 are the exponent in the expo-power function and the distortion
parameter associated with the expo-power; n2 and δ2 are the parameters
employing the power specification. Standard errors where convergence is obtained
are in brackets.
model can help explain the responses. The estimated results were
obtained using the STATA program of Harrison et al. (2010). Some
salient empirical results are reported in Table 1.
Convergence of parameters was a problem in some specifica-
tions as also encountered by Harrison et al. (2010). However, the
reported results are reasonably clear cut, and they illustrate that
theMarkowitzmodel, exhibit 2, has a better fit to theHarrison data
than the power specification of CPT, exhibit 1. In all cases the es-
timate of the exponent in the expo-power value function is signif-
icantly greater than unity. Estimates of the probability distortion
parameters are greater than unity, which was also a feature of the
results for CPT that Harrison et al. reported.
We also estimated some mixture models that for this data set
reveal that a model that is a weighted average of the Markowitz
model and CPT provides the best overall fit, though CPT only
receives a 6.5% weight.4. Conclusions
We demonstrated that assuming a power value function, when
the true function is of the expo-power form, could lead to seriously
misleading implications for the properties of the value function
and the degree of probability distortion. In fact, CPT can appear
to parsimoniously fit a data set when the true model is of the
Markowitz form. Overall, our results lead us to suggest that in
experimental work estimates of the expo-power function should
be reported.
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